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We examine the nature, extent and possible causes of bank contagion in a high frequency 
setting. Looking at six major European banks in the summer and autumn of 2008, we model 
the lower coexceedances of these banks returns. We find that market microstructure, volatility 
(measured  by  range  based  measures)  and  limited  general  market  conditions  are  key 
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Introduction  
The crisis that originated in the subprime mortgage market in the US was strongly felt in all 
international  financial  sectors  across  the  globe.    While  it  started  in  the  credit  market  in 
summer 2007, its destructive force was not fully sensed until the beginning of the first quarter 
of 2008. The short respite that emerged in the subsequent quarter was to be followed by 
strong downward corrections in the summer of the same year. The interchangeable losing and 
restoring of investors’ confidence around the globe was conditioned by the global financial 
crisis  that  has  already  claimed  allegedly  not-too-big–to-fail  Bear  Stearns  and  Lehman 
Brothers in the US.
 1  
In an attempt to avoid similar problems in the European financial system at the beginning of 
2008 many banks issued additional share rights to shore up reserves requested for justifying 
subsequent  right-offs  or  re-intermediation  of  Residential  Mortgaged-Backed  Securities 
(RMBS) and ABS Collateralised Debt Obligation (CDO) originating in the US. Secondly, 
financial intermediaries became increasingly wary of extending new loans which led to an 
increase  in  interest  rates  and  a  consequent  spill-over  of  the  crisis  into  the  real  sector  of 
economies. By  end of September 2008, EURIBOR rates had on average increased 17 basis 
points  with  respect  to  the  previous  month,  while  the  spread  between  the  three-month 
EURIBOR  and  overnight  lending  rates  (EONIA),  the  latter  is  a  good  forecast  of  future 
European Central Banks’ interest rates, doubled from 64 basis points to 125 basis points over 
the  same  period.  Thirdly,  the  number  of  mergers  and  acquisitions  in  the  banking  sector 
declined in the first half of 2008. In 2007, EU banks recorded not only the highest annual 
value of M&A deals in a decade, but also the largest spree of acquisitions outside of the USA. 
By contrast, in 2008 after the exclusion of the acquisition of ABN Amro by a consortium of 
Halifax Royal Bank of Scotland, Fortis and Santander there was no extensive M&A activity 
(European Central Bank
b, 2008).  
In the environment of distrust and extreme caution the member countries of the European 
Union in  general and the  eurozone, in particular, individually  decided  to  shore  up  ailing 
banks. The government of Ireland increased the deposit guarantee from €20,000 to €100,000 
and subsequently extended an unlimited guarantee to all deposits leading domestic financial 
institutions.  This  move  was  heavily  criticised  by  Eurozone  member  countries  as  unfair 
competition that could have led to an exodus of depositors from countries with less generous 
protection schemes.
2 To counteract this a chain of similar guarantees was put in place by othe 
                                                       
1 In June 2007 two hedge funds of Bear Sterns were heavily exposed to the subprime market and 
ensuing difficulties lead to an increase in credit default swap premia (Cassola et al., 2008) 
2 The Commonwealth of Australia introduced the same plan, but the government’s decision has been 
heavily criticised by opposition leaders and managers whose banks were not included in the scheme. In 
October 2008, Greece, Denmark, Sweden and Austria decided to support all bank deposits, as well (See 
Appendix I)  Page 2 of 14 
remaining Eurozone members. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) increased 
guarantee from US$100,000 to US$250,000 per depositor until 31 December, 2009, while EU 
member countries focused on a €100,000 scheme and a rapid process of case resolutions (up 
to three days). Both decisions were criticised by the European Banking Federation as rather 
demanding due to the varying financial (fiscal) strength of member states and administrative 
constraints that could not shorten the current 3-month to a mere 3-day resolution period. 
Cultural differences among EU countries and incoherent approach to the global crisis reflect 
difficulties that EU faces in challenging times as these. In addition, in nine out of fifteen euro 
area countries the level of general government debt is either close to or in excess of the 60% 
mark of respective GDPs, which limits the amount of extra debt that could be borrowed by 
national governments.
3  Monetary flexibility is rather limited not only by the strict ECB’s 
policy aimed at stemming inflationary pressures, but also by the non-existence of national 
monetary policies. The relaxing of fiscal austerity seems to be the only remaining panacea, 
which  will  not  only  reduce  the  amount  of  disposable  income  for  taxpayers  and  further 
increase government debt levels, but also question the zeal of EU Commission in enforcing its 
own guidelines that represent the foundation of the euro zone.    
In this paper we examine leading banks in the euro area measured by the level of 
market  capitalization  in  2008.  The  largest  financial  intermediaries  have  extensive  analyst 
following and in smaller markets they may be the leading companies without comparable 
substitutes. Therefore, trading patters may reflect the general trading sentiment. In addition, 
Bonson,  Escobar  et  al.  (2008)  find  that  the  size  of  European  banking  institutions  and 
investment firms is positively related to the application of better risk management practices, 
and assuming that better practices are related to more effective risk management we can 
reduce the analysis to intraday trading patterns that reflect more a level of sentiment rather 
than fundementals. Accordingly, the size bias does not seem to enhance the problem of poor 
risk management.    
 
Contagion and Coexceedances 
Over  the  decade  from  the  Asian  crisis  of  1997  to  the  beginning  of  2007  a  very 
significant body of research on the interlinked concepts of contagion (excess co movement of 
assets beyond that which would be expected from fundamentals) and asset interrelationships, 
spillovers and interdependencies has emerged. These have enhanced both our understanding 
of the dynamics of contagion and the tools that are available to investigate. As an exemplar, 
Forbes and Rigobon (2002) et seq showed the need for research to move beyond simplistic 
                                                       
3 Among other 12 non-euroarea countries only Hungary violates the 60% benchmark. However, with 
the exception of Sweden, Denmark and the UK all other countries sport much lower levels of GDP per 
capita than the EU average, which questions their ability to support sizeable financial commitments. 
(European Central Bank
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models based on unconditional correlation matrices. Contagion has thus become seen as a 
distinct phenomenon from integration and from increased or decreased integration. There has 
also been an increase in the literature discussing the various approaches taken for defining 
contagion (See Corsetti, Pericoli et al. (2005) who identify at least five different measures and  
the first part of Gravelle, Kichian et al. (2006)  
In this paper we take the notion of contagion as arising from extrema of distributions. 
The original paper of Bae, Karoli et al. (2003) casts  contagion as contemporaneous instances 
of asset prices lying in a particular, negative, portion of the realised distribution. This has the 
intuitive appeal that it respects the notion that individual assets have greater or lesser inherent 
volatility. For some assets a fall of 5% may be exceptional while for others a fall of 2% may 
represent the same degree of “exceptionalness”. Their work used multivariate probit analyses 
to uncover the common factors that drive asset classes returns to lie in the same percentile of 
their realised distributions.  
Contagion studies proper also focus on the behaviour of asset returns during times of 
crisis. Many of the methodological issues discussed in papers such as Corsetti, Pericoli et al. 
(2005) and Gravelle, Kichian et al. (2006) relate to the identification of crises periods, the 
windows over which analyses should be concluded and the issues in dealing with shifts in 
regimes  as  systems  move  from  calm  to  crisis  and  back.  The  advantage  of  using  a 
coexceedance model such as we deploy here is that it almost by definition is usable only in 
periods of crisis when assets are falling across the range studied. Defining “shift contagion” in 
the commonly agreed manner, as a change or break during a crisis period in the transmission 
mechanisms  of  how  assets  are  related,  coexceedances  are  a  natural  measure  of  this 
phenomenon. We define contagion here as the existence of a common (unspecified) shock 
that propagates across the assets in question, which predisposes them to move into a similar 
position in their distribution, and which shock emerges from a source external to the assets in 
question. A shock occurs which causes the banks in this analysis to exhibit returns which are 
extreme in each case.  
This definition is essentially that used in the relatively few papers that have used this 
modelling approach.  Groop, LoDuca et al. (2006) use a distance to default measure (derived 
from the BSOPM) to analyse contagion, on a daily frequency, among EU banks over a 9 year 
period. They concentrate on the 95
th percentile coexceedance and find evidence of periods of 
contagion.  This  work  is  similar  to  that  of  Hartmann,  Straetmans  et  al.  (2004)    who  use 
extreme  value  theory  to  surface  US-European  contagious  episodes.  Outside  the  equity 
markets  Baur and Schulze (2005) and Christiansen and Ranaldo (2008) apply a coexceedance 
model to equity markets, also using a daily approach.  
We believe that this present paper advances the literature in several ways. First, we 
focus on high frequency analyses, using 30m data over a 6m period of generally accepted Page 4 of 14 
crisis. Second, we focus on a set of assets that are very homogenous, Eurozone large banks. 
Third,  we  uncover  dynamics  not  just  from  the  general  market  but  also  from  other  asset 
markets including the gold market which has been shown in previous work (Baur and Schulze 
(2005))  to  be  a  safe  haven  asset  in  times  of  market  stress.  Finally,  we  employ  a  non-
parametric  model  of  volatility,  the  Garman-Klass  estimator,  which  belongs  to  a  class  of 
estimators with desirable properties under high frequency data stylised facts.  
 
Methodology  
In  order  to  determine  the  relationship  between  the  number  of  coexeedances  and 
selected dependent variables we will apply the Multinomial Logit Model (Greene (2000)).
4 
As suggested by Groop, LoDuca et al. (2006)  it is advisable to use either order logit or 
multinomial (unordered) logit model. The latter model is more appropriate, because it does 
not  assume  that  the  move  from  0  or  no-coexeedances  to  1  or  two  to  three  banks  with 
coexeedances  is  the  same  as  moving  from  1  to  2,  ie.  four  or  more  banks  involved  in 
coexeedances.  
 


















    (1) 
where j = 0, 1 and 2, i.e. the indicator whether the case of a) no coexeedance, b) two or three 
banks or c) more than three banks have coexeedances, respectively exist; M are common 
shocks,  variability  measures  and  commonly  accepted  market  microstructure  variables  to 
which  companies  in  the  eurozone  are  exposed,  while  j β   is  a  vector  of  coefficients  for 
variable j. The base category is Y = 0, which helps alleviate the level of indeterminacy in this 
model.




                                                       
4 In probit models it is assumed that error terms have joint multivariate normal distribution with 0 mean 
and arbitrary variance-covariance matrix, which in the case of market microstructure data sets becomes 
rather difficult to assume. Horowitz (1980) concludes that logit models provide consistent parameter 
estimates as long as the utility functions are linear.  
5 All coefficients are calculated with respect to 0 as a new base. The normalization process involves the 
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We  collect  from  Reuters  High-Low-Open-Close  price  data  for  6  large  European 
banks  in  the  Eurozone:  Banco  Santander,  BNP  Paribas,  Societe  General,  Banco  Bilbao, 
Deutsche Bank and Credit Agricole. For this paper all measures are, except where noted, 
constructed using close returns. These data are sampled at 30m frequencies, from 6 June 2008 
to 15 October 2008. In total we have 1540 observations. These banks, at end October 2008, 
represent 42% of the FTSE Eurotop Banking Index by market capitalization. The choice of 
banks was dictated by they being in the top ten by market capitalization of the FTSE Eurotop 
Banking  Index,  and  being  denominated  in  euro.  We  were  unable  to  obtain  accurate 
information for three banks that met this criterion – Unicredito and SanPaolo and National 
Bank of Greece. We also collect total volume of shares traded (measured in euro millions) 
within each thirty minute period. As a control on general stock market as opposed to bank 
shocks we collect the same information on the DJ EuroSTOXX50 index
6. This also allows us 
to capture asset class issues.  
To capture possible flight to safety we include data on gold, measured as the London 
AM Fix. Baur and Lucey (forthcoming) find that in periods of market stress gold becomes n 
attractive  “safe  haven”  for  investors.  We  also  include  overnight  LIBOR,  the  London 
Interbank  Offered  Rate,  as  a  measure  of  credit  conditions.  Both  Gold  and  LIBOR  are 
measured as percentage changes. LIBOR and Gold represent a data problem in that both are 
fixed at 1100hGMT. We overceme this with an alignment of data ; for each day, when the 
bank data refer to times pre 1100h we use t-1 LIBOR and Gold data, and from times after 
1100h GMT we use that days measures.  
To capture volatility effects on coexceedances we use two measures of volatility. We 
first  use  a  standard  conditional  volatility  measure.   Conditional  variances  were  estimated 
using a ARMA(1,1)-GARCH(1,1) specification with a skewed-t distribution for the errors. 
We estimate this for the STOXX index and also for each bank. These individual banking 
measures are then averaged to obtain a composite banking average conditional volatility. We 
also measure the volatility using the Garman-Klass (Garman and Klass (1980) – hereafter 
GKe) range based volatility estimator. The novelty of the GKe approach lies in the use of use 
of the open, close, high and low price within a particular time interval in its calculation. The 
GKe  therefore  provides  an  alternative,  volatility  measure  to  the  standard  deviation  and 
GARCH approach, which utilises the price change between consecutive time intervals   The 
within period focus allows us to peer more deeply into the high frequency dynamics than do 
other methods. The GKe and other range based volatility measures have been investigated by 
Shu and Zhang (2006) and Alizadeh, Brandt et al. (2002), who conclude that they represent a 
                                                       
6 Note that this index does include in its composition the banks we study here. However, absent an 
index of non-financial companies in the Eurozone that is also available at 30m intervals we are forced 
to use this as the most general proxy available. The banks we analyse constitute approx 10% of the 
market value of the STOXX index. Page 6 of 14 
low-bias and efficient measure of the theoretical volatility and are superior in these respects to 
the GARCH estimators.  
 
From Garman and Klass (1980), the GKe is: 
 
GKe =  ) O (C-   0.383   -   C) (l-   C) 2 L- (H+   O) (C-   0.019   -   ) L (H-   0.511   =  
2 2 2 σ             (2) 
 
where  H =  log of interval high  
  L =  log of interval low 
  O =  log of interval open 
  C =  log of interval close 
 
 
Coexceedances are coded 1 where two or three banks exhibit coexceedances, 2 where 
four or more of the six banks exhibit coexceedances. Two banks exhibit coexceedances when 
both  have  returns  in  that  period  which  are  in  the  lower  5
th  percentile  of  their  realised 
distribution.  
Finally, we also create indicator variables for a number of microstructure issues. We 
create dummy variables to indicate if the time is in the early part of the trading day, defined as 
before 0900h; to indicate if the time overlaps with the opening of the US market; and to 




In  Figure  1  are  the  numbers  of  banks  exhibiting  coexceedances  over  the  period. 
Despite the prominence given to banking stocks in market reports in the September-October 
period, it is clear that instances where 5 or 6 banks showed declines in the lower 5% of their 
distributions were also evident in the early summer. However, it is also evident that this 
severe coexceedance pattern was more frequent in the later part of the summer. Of the 33 
instances where 5 or 6 banks exhibit coexceedance we find that slightly more than one third 
(12) appear before the start of September 2008 
 
Shown in table 1 are the results of the multinomial logit analyses. A number of points 
are  evident.  The  coefficient  estimate  for  the  constant  is  mainly  insignificant.  There  is 
consistent evidence that coexceedances are more likely to occur when the market is in its 
opening  phase.  This  effect  is  stronger  for  the  higher  coexceedance  model.  This  finding 
confirms the importance of the opening sessions (see for example Chelley-Steeley (2005)) Page 7 of 14 
Contrary to the findings of Groop, LoDuca et al. (2006) and Christiansen and Ranaldo (2008) 
we find no evidence of significant autoregressive behaviour in the occurrence of sampled 
banks’ coexceedancess. Furthermore, there is no evidence on the impact of overlap with the 
US market, apart from a weak support for this claim when many coexceedances occur and 
conditional volatilities are included as independent variables. This limited evidence on the 
impact of the US market on coexceedances in the European context is in conflict with that 
found in Christiansen and Ranaldo (2008) for developed markets but is consistent with their 
findings for accession countries. We also find very little evidence in the data of either a flight 
to quality or to a safe haven, with gold changes having a marginally positive and negative (for 
larger  coexeedances),  but  not  significant  effect  on  the  coexceedances.  We  do  not  find 
evidence of the impact of credit conditions.  
Of much more importance in determining the coexceedances is the change in volume 
traded in STOXX Index, indicating a degree of contagion or spillover from the general market 
to the financial market: we see a positive relationship here, where increases in the general 
market are associated with a higher likelihood of a coexceedance in the banking sector.  This 
would accord well with the idea that coexceedances are associated not just with declining 
prices but with an actual flight from equities; not just are stocks marked down but there is an 
increased sale of said stocks. For the volume of bank shares traded there is a negative sign in 
both models, but the coefficient estimates are not statistically significant.  
Volatility  emerges  as  the  other  major  determinant  of  coexceedances.  Conditional 
volatility measures are insignificant. This may reflect an inadequacy of the GARCH model, 
an inappropriate aggregation of the GARCH volatilities to an overall, or an actual result. If it 
is  an  actual  result  however  it  demonstrates  that  the  range  based  approaches,  which  peer 
“inside” the period when price is being determined, provide a more refined insight into the 
impact of volatility on coexceedances. Our results are similar to the findings on volatility as 
per Bae, Karoli et al. (2003), Groop, LoDuca et al. (2006) and Christiansen and Ranaldo 
(2008). However, the findings in these papers are for conditional volatility, which we find 
here  to  be  mainly  insignificant.  The  findings  here  are  more  significant  for  range  based 
estimates. We attribute this difference to the fact that our analyses are conducted on high 
frequency data, as opposed to the daily and lower frequencies of the other papers which have 
used this approach.  
Our  results  show  reasonable  explanatory  power.  The  pseudo-R
2  values  are  8.79-
11.8% which is higher from that found by Christiansen and Ranaldo (2008) and in line with 
the findings of Groop, LoDuca et al. (2006). The statistics found here are somewhat closer to 
the 10% findings in  Bae, Karoli et al. (2003).  
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Conclusions 
The banking and financial crisis of 2008 has left a rich field for the analysis of contagion and 
interrelationships.  Based on the multinomial logit model we further discover that the number 
of coexeedances is more prevalent during the early trading session due to influx of overnight 
information. There is a week support for the impact of the US market. The change in traded 
volume in STOXX index demonstrates a positive impact in extreme coexeedances’ model. 
Finally, the conditional volatility seems to have no influence on coexeedance patterns, while 
the Garman-Klass measure proves to be more statistically powerful.  Page 9 of 14 
Table 1. Multinomial logit analysis 
   Two or Three coexceedances  Four or More coexceedances 
Variable   Coeff  p-value  Coeff  p-value  Coeff  p-value  Coeff  p-value 
CONSTANT  -3.69047  0.210644  -8.90183  0.010153  -4.76483  0.44141  -9.48827  0.089834 
COEXCODE1  0.362259  0.220582  0.40928  0.134974  -0.45931  0.410048  -0.42702  0.360888 
MIDWEEK  -0.5  0.134016  -0.29506  0.301538  -0.21373  0.6193  0.00312  0.993046 
EARLY  1.1895***  0.000608  1.33732***  0.000597  2.419586***  8.5E-07  2.67465***  2E-08 
NYSEISOPEN  -0.31396  0.329721  0.23667  0.471781  0.217848  0.743393  0.98199*  0.05123 
XSTOXRt-1  0.03476  0.961301  0.45588  0.549985  -1.82811  0.121867  0.56327  0.428221 
GOLDFIX  0.000652  0.817111  0.00178  0.489957  -0.0005  0.888502  -0.00043  0.895777 
LIBORFIX  -0.15528  0.692918  0.74115  0.198657  -0.00697  0.994878  1.04762  0.267576 
CSTOXXRt-1  24.30151  0.276744  8.68202  0.797574  -43.9649  0.216324  -47.4678*  0.090054 
VOLSTOXXCHG  0.638713  0.104458  0.73672*  0.052951  1.129103***  0.000677  1.16915***  0.000269 
MEANVOLCHG  0.009683  0.964459  -0.04643  0.84077  -0.04371  0.876894  -0.0328  0.885653 
GKSTOXXK  -4037.88***  0.000898        -4143.11***  0.003109       
GKSTOXXKt-1  -1681.79**  0.02052        -4766.76***  0.008936       
MEANGKVOLK  79.95933  0.144089        127.3819***  0       
MEANGKVOLKt-1  27.05954*  0.075595        -8.15027  0.795797       
CONDVSTOXX        63.3502  0.991445        -1360.89  0.759921 
CONDVSTOXXt-1        -727.599  0.849316        -120.198  0.974155 
AVGCONDVOL        -1060.76  0.947986        2738.318  0.890173 
AVGCONDVOLt-1        5970.831  0.706348        2634.303  0.892815 
Pseudo-R
2  11.8%    8.79%    11.8%    8.79%   
***  p-value < 1% 
**    p-value < 5% 
*      p-value < 10% 
dependent variable is the number of coexeedances, i.e. 0 for no coexceedance, 1 for two or three banks coexceeding and 2 for 
four or more banks involved in coexeedances. COEXCODE1 is lagged value of coexeedances; MIDWEEK equals 1 if the days 
in the week are Tuesday, Wednesday and Thursday; EARLY is a dummy variable denoting that intervals are calculated prior to 
9.00am; NYSEISOPEN equals 1 for the trading period when NYSE is open, otherwise it is 0: GOLDFIX is the change in the 
value of gold based on London AM Fix; LIBORFIX is the change in the value of daily LIBOR rate; XSTOXR1is the number of 
coexeedances in the STOXX index; CSTOXXR1 is the lagged close return in the STOXX index; VOLSTOXXCHG  is the 
change in volume traded in STOXX index; MEANVOLCHG is the average change in the volume of bank shares traded; 
GKSTOXXK  is  the  value  of  Garman-Klass  range  volatility  estimator  for  STOXX;  CONDVSTOXX  is  ARMA(1,1)-
GARCH(1,1) conditional volatility measure for STOXX index; MEANGKVOLK is the average value of Garman-Klass range 
volatility estimator for banks; AVGCONDVOL is average ARMA(1,1)-GARCH(1,1) conditional volatility measure for bank 
returns; 
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Appendix I 
 
Timeline of Financial Crisis in Europe 
 
•  13 September 2007 – UK bank Northern Rock applies for emergency funding support by 
the Bank of England 
•  14 September 2007 – Bank run on Northern Rock 
•  17 September 2008 – LIBOR reaches a seven-year high 
•  18 September 2008 – Central banks provide $180 billion in support of global liquidity 
•  19 September 2008 – Thanks to the short-selling ban and US rescue plan announcement 
FTSE regains 315 point to end the trading day at 5,195. 
•  21 September 2008 – The Financial Services Authority involved in talks regarding the 
potential bail-out of Bradford and Bingley, the banking and financial planning group. 
•  25 September 2008 – Ireland is the first country in the eurozone to face recession.  
•  28 September 2008 – the governments of the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg buy 
€11.2 billion of bad assets and assume 49 percent of ownership in Fortis, one of the 
largest bank and insurance conglomerates in Europe. Spain’s Banco de Santander buys 
200 branches of Bradford and Bingley and £22 billion savings. 
•  29  September  2008  –  the  federal  government  in  Germany  along  with  selected  banks 
provides a rescue package amounting to €35 billion to support Hypo Real Estate. The 
British government acquired Bradford and Bingley for €63 billion. The government of 
Iceland takes up 75 percent stake in the largest local bank, Glitnir, for €0.6 billion. 
•  30 September – the Irish government is the first to guarantee all bank deposits over the 
upcoming two years. Dexia, the municipal lender, seeks for bail-out. 
•  1 October 2008 – Fortis abandons its seasoned equity offering plan to raise €3 billion due 
to the lack of market interest 
•  2 October 2008 – Greece secures all deposits in Greek banks 
•  3  October  2008  –  the  UK  government  increases  the  compensation  for  deposits  from 
£35,000 to £50,000. The government of Netherlands purchases the local branch of Fortis 
for €16.8 billion 
•  5 October 2008 – The rescue package for Hypo Real Estate increased from €35 to €50 
billion. BNP Paribas acquires Fortis’ branches in Belgium and Luxembourg for €14.5 
billion. 
•  6  October  2008  –  the  authorities  in  Denmark,  Sweden  and  Austria  secure  all  bank 
deposits. In Iceland there is trade suspension at the stock exchange. 
•  8 October 2008 – The Icelandic internet bank, Icesave, is in default. UK government 
declares that they might sue Iceland for losses incurred by British depositors.  Page 13 of 14 
•  13 October 2008 – The UK government promises to pay £37 billion to recapitalize the 
Royal Bank of Scotland, HBOS and Lloyds TSB. 
•  14 October 2008 – The Icelandic stock exchange continues trading after a week period. 
The index declines by 76% after the opening session. 
•  16 October 2008 – The Swiss government provides support for UBS, while Credit Suisse 
manages to raise money from private investors and sovereign investment funds.  
•  27  October  2008  -  IMF  provided  £16.5  billion  rescue  package  for  mainly  Eastern 
European  countries  and  Turkey.  Hungary  seeks  a  €10  billion  rescue  package,  while 
Ukraine due to political stalemate cannot make a decision about the rescue package.  
•  28 October 2008 – Bank of England estimates that due to the recent market correction 
financial institutions around the globe have lost approximately $2.8 trillion 
•  31 October 2008 – Barclays announces the investment of £7.3 billion by Middle Eastern 
investors who are expected to become owners of one-third of the bank.  
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